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INTRODUCTION  
 
It is a great pleasure for me to lecture at the University of Buckingham, of 
which my late father Lord Beloff was the founding father, and my son Rupert 
obtained first class honours in law and won the Palamountain prize for 
excellence.  It seems that as a mere visiting Professor I take third place in my 
family’s quest for this innovative University’s honours.   
This is, of course, an inaugural lecture and I express the modest hope that 
it will sufficiently command your attention to guarantee that it will not be a 
valedictory one as well.  My duties as visiting Professor are to give a 
minimum of a single lecture over four terms – not the most testing of 
obligations but one more demanding than that of an Oxford Professor who, 
when asked what he did to earn his stipend, explained “I give an annual 
lecture – but not, you understand, every year”. 
I have chosen as the opening words of my title that famous phrase of 
Lenin, the Bolshevik dictator, in which he summarised his world view “Who 
– Whom?” – which people have power over which other people – adapting it 
to judicial review of which Lenin was of course wholly ignorant and of which 
he would certainly have disapproved.  It was not the function of Courts in 
Lenin’s eyes to restrict public authorities’ exercise of powers, but rather to 
ensure that any challenge to that exercise was firmly suppressed.  But I want 
to exploit the phrase to discuss the questions of who is entitled to bring a 
claim for judicial review and against which bodies – questions which, three 
decades on from the creation of the judicial review machinery admit still of no 
final answer, although there is, as I shall demonstrate, far more certainty about 
the ‘who’ than the ‘whom.’   
I should add that, to my chagrin, I discovered that the same two words 
introduced an essay I wrote in a book in honour of Lord Slynn,1 a most 
∗ The Hon Michael J Beloff, Blackstone Chambers, MA (Oxon).  
1 “Judicial Review in International Perspective” in M Andenas and D Fairgrieve (eds) 
Liber Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley (Kluwer Law International, 
2000). 
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distinguished advocate and judge who has close connections with this 
university not least through his wife Odile, who taught here.  It is not, I 
suppose, a serious academic crime to plagiarise oneself, but I shall try as far 
as possible, to ensure that these words are the least original part of my lecture, 
and to avoid the reproach that my text is too technical for the non-lawyers 
while too general for the lawyers. 
I have deliberately chosen as my starting point 1977, when the rules of the 
Supreme Court (“RSC”), were amended, so as to provide for judicial review 
in Order 53.  The Rules reached their present incarnation in the Civil 
Procedure Rules of 1997 (“CPR”), not entirely helpfully renumbered 54.  The 
order has been, I remind you, cautiously fortified by the Supreme Court Act 
1981 (“SCA”) in order to avert to the possibility that some imaginative person 
might challenge the legality of reforming procedural law is so significant, a 
way by mere secondary legislation using, presumably and paradoxically, 
judicial review itself.      
 
THE WHO 
 
Rules as to locus standi in public law divide persons into two categories: 
those who have access to the Courts to challenge decisions of public 
authorities and those who do not. 
Prior to the 1977 reforms the interests required to bring proceedings to 
challenge administrative action resembled patchwork quilt, rather than a 
seamless robe.  There was then more certainty about the “whom” than about 
the “who”. Different interests were required for different remedies: 
Declarations and injunctions could be sought against public bodies, but were 
only available in private law actions by way of writ or originating summons 
by persons whose own rights were in issue.  The grant of the order prerogative 
remedies, in form sought on the Queen’s behalf, if in substance on behalf of 
the subject, was conditioned by more flexible but more variable criteria.2  The 
complex and incoherent mélange of rules was one of the best reasons for 
reform of the procedures of public law.3  
In O’Reilly v Mackman4 Lord Diplock was able to say:  
 
“Order 53 since 1977 has provided a procedure by which every type 
of remedy for infringement of the rights of individuals that are entitled 
to protection in public law can be obtained in one and the same 
proceeding by way of a n application for judicial review, and 
2 See generally H W R Wade and C F Forsyth Administrative Law  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 9th edn,  2004) (“Wade”) pp 681-690. 
3 Ibid pp 697-708. 
4 [1983] 2 AC 237. 
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whichever remedy is found to be the most appropriate in the light of 
what has emerged upon the hearing of the application, can be granted 
to him.”5
 
Under the new system there was a single test of locus.  Order 53 r 3 
provided simply “The Court shall not grant leave unless it considers that the 
Applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application 
relates”.   
The phrase “sufficient interest” was selected by the Rules Committee as to 
embrace all putative applicants but simultaneously to discriminate between 
them. 
Although Lord Scarman suggested, in the so-called Fleet Street Casuals6 
case, that the language of the legal instrument “presents no problem of 
construction”, in fact neither statute nor rule gives any guidance as to what is 
“sufficient interest” in the matter to which the application relates”; they 
stipulate only that sufficiency of interest is a sine qua non for entitlement to a 
full hearing. 
There were nonetheless two obvious implications of the language chosen: 
firstly, not everyone could engage judicial review, however meritorious the 
claim.  Secondly, interest entitling one to do so had to be sufficient – a fluid 
and fact sensitive concept.   
But almost immediately its content was diluted.  In the same Fleet Street 
Casuals case, a group of tax payers challenged tax amnesty given to rogue 
printers.  Despite the phraseology of the Order 53 (which expressly addresses 
the leave stage), the House of Lords held that, except in obvious cases, 
questions sufficient interest ought not to be dealt with at that stage when one 
side only was present but postponed until the full hearing of the application 
when both were.7  This judicial gloss provides an important safeguard against 
the adoption of too restrictive an approach to standing: it brings the substance 
of the challenge firmly into play. 
Although locus was held to go to jurisdiction ie could not be conceded,8 it 
is now very rare to find a case in which the applicant failed on locus grounds. 
5 Ibid, at 283. 
6 R v Inland Revenue Commissioner, ex p Federation of the Self-Employed [1982] AC 
617. Commented on by P Cane “Standing Legality and the Unity of Public Law” 
[1981] PL 322. 
7 R v MMC, ex p Argyll Group [1986] 1 WLR 763, Lord Donaldson MR said at 773 
“the first stage test which applies on an application for leave will lead to refusal if the 
applicant has no interest whatsoever and the applicant’s interest is one of the facts to 
be weighed in the balance.” 
8 R v Secretary of State for Social Services, ex p Child Poverty Action Group (1990) 2 
QB 540 at 556 D-G. Woolf LJ said: “the question of locus standi goes to the 
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In the Rose Theatre case9 Schiemann J held that an ad hoc group had no locus 
to challenge the Secretary of State’s refusal to schedule the theatre as an 
ancient monument.10   He dismissed the argument that persons who combine 
together for a particular cause have more claim on the court’s time than 
solitary crusaders, but in my submission, counter-intuitively since the very 
aggregation underscores the genuineness of the interest.    
Schiemann J was the King Canute of judicial review, battling against an 
irreversible tide – although he defended himself against his critics in an 
academic journal – an unusual; weapon of last resort for a serving judge.11
In judicial review, the factors which the court now takes into account in 
deciding whether an applicant has standing are: 
 
(i) the merits of the application; 
(ii) the importance of maintaining the rule of law; 
(iii) the importance of the issue raised; 
(iv) the likely absence of any other responsible challenger; 
(v) the nature of the breach of duty against which relief is sought; and 
(vi) the expertise and experience of the applicant body. 
 
In Greenpeace No 212 where the environmental pressure group challenged 
authorisations given for the discharge of radioactive waste, Otton J said:13   
 
“It seems to me that if I were to deny standing to Greenpeace, those it 
represents might not have an effective way to bring the issues before 
the court.  There would have to be an application either by an 
individual employee of BNFL or a near neighbour.  In this case it is 
unlikely that either would be able to command the expertise which is 
at the disposal of Greenpeace.  Consequently, a less well-informed 
challenge might be mounted which would stretch unnecessarily the 
court’s resources and which would not afford the court the assistance 
it requires in order to do justice between the parties.  Further, if the 
unsuccessful Applicant had the benefit of legal aid it might leave the 
jurisdiction of the Court and therefore … the parties are not entitled to confer 
jurisdiction, which the court does not have, on the court by consent.” 
9 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Rose Theatre Trust Co [1990] QB 
504. 
10 P Cane “Statutes, Standing and Representation” [1990] PL 307, especially at 310-
311. 
11 Sir Konrad Schiemann “Locus Standi” [1990] PL 342. 
12 R v Inspectorate of Pollution and another, ex p Greenpeace Ltd (No2) [1994] 4 All 
ER 329. 
13 Ibid, at 350. 
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respondents and BNFL without an effective remedy in costs.  
Alternatively, the individual (or Greenpeace) might see, to persuade 
Her Majesty’s Attorney General to commence a relator action which 
(as a matter of policy or practice) he may be reluctant to undertake 
against a government department.  Neither of these courses of action 
would have the advantage of an application by Greenpeace, who, with 
its particular experience in environmental matters, its access to experts 
in the relevant realms of science and technology (not to mention the 
law), is able to mount a carefully selected, focused, relevant and well-
argued challenge.”14   
 
In accordance with this generous approach, the courts have entertained 
applications brought by bodies such as the Joint Council for the Welfare of 
Immigrants,15 the Child Poverty Action Group,16 the World Development 
Movement,17 the Equal Opportunities Commission18 and Shelter.19   
This migration of pressure groups from the political to the legal arena has 
been assisted by the development of protective cost orders to assist those with 
virtuous motives but without adequate funds to immunise themselves against 
a potential liability to meet the other side’s costs in accordance with the 
underlying principle of English law that loser pays. 
In R (Corner House) v Trade and Industry Secretary (CA),20 where a 
pressure group sought to challenge ECGD’s anti-corruption guidelines, the 
Court of Appeal said: 
 
“(1) A protective costs order may be made at any stage of the 
proceedings, on such conditions as the court thinks fit, provided that 
the court is satisfied that: (i) the issues raised are of general public 
importance; (ii) the public interest requires that those issues should be 
resolved; (iii) the Applicant has no private interest in the outcome of 
14 I (boastfully) declare an interest in the penultimate observation since I was 
Greenpeace’s advocate.    
15 R v Secretary of State for Social Security, ex p Joint Council for the Welfare of 
Immigrants [1997] 1 WLR 275.  
16 R v Secretary of State for Social Services, ex p Child Poverty Action Group [1990] 
2 QB 540. 
17 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p The World 
Development Movement [1995] 1 WLR 586.  
18 R v Secretary of State for Employment, ex p Equal Opportunities Commission 
[1995] AC 1. 
19 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Shelter [1997] COD 49. 
20 Regina (Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, CA, 
[2005] EWCA Civ 192 [2005] 1 WLR 2600. 
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the case; (iv) having regard to the financial resources of the Applicant 
and the Respondent(s) and to the amount of costs that are likely to be 
involved, it is fair and just to make the order; and (v) if the order is not 
made the Applicant will probably discontinue the proceedings and 
will be acting reasonably in so doing. 
 
(2) If those acting for the Applicant are doing so pro bono this will be 
likely to enhance the merits of the application for a PCO. 
 
(3) It is for the court, in its discretion, to decide whether it is fair and 
just to make the order in the light of the considerations set out 
above.”21
 
The principled explanation for this relaxed judicial attitude lies in the very 
nature of public law. Sedley J has famously stated: 
 
“Public law is not at base about rights, even though abuses of power 
may and often do invade private rights; it is about wrongs – that is to 
say misuses of public power, and the courts have always been alive to 
the fact that a person or organisation with no particular stake in the 
issue or the outcome may, without any sense being a mere meddler, 
wish and be well placed to call the attention of the court to an apparent 
misuse of power.”22
 
So if locus is denied at all it is only usually denied when a claim is 
brought by someone whose interest is remote in tandem with someone with a 
more direct interest: The NUM but not the TUC could represent one of its 
members on a welfare issue.23 The British Herpetological Society but not the 
World Wildlife Fund on an environmental one.24 It is no doubt rightly 
suspected by the Court that the party denied locus was more concerned with 
publicity than with remedy.  On the other hand, despite the doubts of Forbes J 
at first instance both a local reporter and the NUJ had standing to challenge a 
Magistrate’s Court decision to hold in private the committal hearing of 
persons charged with gun running.25
21 At para 74. 
22 In R v Somerset County Council and ARC Southern Ltd, ex p Dixon (1992) COD 
323. 
23 R v CAO ex p Bland Times 6 February 1985. 
24 R v Poole BC ex p Beebie [1991] COD 264. 
25 R v Horsham JJ, ex p Farquarson [1982] QB 762.  I was instructed for the NUJ by 
Harriet Harman.  Tempora Mutantur … 
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The individual busybody denied standing is an almost extinct beast: one 
such was the Church of England priest who sought to challenge the ordination 
of women priests – but (unwisely) in Wales!26
A curious (and it may be temporary) difference between English and 
Scottish approach in this area was illustrated when former world heavyweight 
champion, Mike Tyson, despite a conviction for rape, was permitted to come 
to Glasgow to wreak violence on some unfortunate British pugilist whose 
chances of success were accurately measured by the business man who 
brought advertising space on the soles of the boxer’s boots. 
Two feminist groups, Justice for Women, south of the border, and The 
Rape Crisis Centre north of it, sought unavailingly to quash the Home 
Secretary’s decision.  In London no locus point was taken.27  In Scotland it 
was.28
Lord Clarke said: 
 
“Some legislation and its related measures will, no doubt, confer a 
right of challenge on individual members of the public as a whole, but 
it is a fallacy to suppose that because of the public interest in ministers 
acting lawfully and fairly that public interest by itself confer on every 
member of the public a right to challenge the minister’s act or 
decision.  Matters must go further, in my judgment, and the individual 
or body seeking to challenge the minister’s act or decision must show 
that, having regard to the scope or purpose of the legislation or 
measures under which the act is performed or the decision is made, he 
or they have had such a right conferred on them by law, either 
expressly or impliedly.”29  
 
Of this viewpoint Lord Hope said in a lecture:  
 
“ an approach to standing which applies a private law test to issues of 
public law is at risk of being out of touch with the public interest in 
26 R v Dean and Chapter of St Paul’s Cathedral (1998 COD 130). In R v Legal Aid 
Board, ex p Bateman [1992] 1 WLR 711, a client who sought further legal aid in 
order to pay her solicitor has held not to have sufficient interest to challenge the 
decision of the Board for refusing it – a not altogether obvious conclusion. 
27 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Bindel  [2001] Imm AR 1 
(QBD). 
28 Rape Crisis Centre Co v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2001 SLT 
389 (OH). 
29 Ibid, at 391. 
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having matters of that kind, about which a section of the public has a 
genuine grievance, litigated in the courts.”30
 
A new problem has been introduced in consequence of the standing test 
under the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”) entirely distinct from the 
sufficient interest test of the SCA.  Section 7(3) of the HRA provides that an 
applicant for judicial review is to be taken to have a sufficient interest in 
relation to the alleged unlawful act only if he is, or would be, a “victim of that 
act”.  Section 7(6) imports into English law that test, as it is applied by the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
The basic principle which has emerged in Strasbourg jurisprudence is that 
a petitioner may claim to be a victim only if he is personally affected by the 
act or omission which is at issue. Although the Court has given an elastic 
meaning to that concept including within it potential victims.31 Indirect 
victims32 representatives of victims33 and even possible victims ie persons 
who cannot know whether they have been the victim of a breach or not 
because their complaint relates to secret measures.34 And even future 
victims,35 there remains a perceptible gulf between the two tests. 
The consequence of this precise translation of the Strasbourg test into 
domestic law is that some claims may not be brought under the HRA which 
might be brought under the common law of human rights.  A pressure group 
might well want to test the validity of certain regulations laid before 
Parliament, but not yet in effect, and ex hypothesi incapable at the time of the 
proposed challenge of having created a class of victims, even though the same 
benefits to the Court as were recognised by Otton J in Greenpeace No.2 
would be present here as well.36  The solution would be to amalgamate the 
HRA with the SCA test albeit with the consequence of disturbing the 
symmetry of the tests applied in Strasbourg and the Strand. 
30 Lord Hope of Craighead “Mike Tyson comes to Glasgow” [2001] PL 294. 
31 Campbell and Cosans 4 EHRR 293. 
32 Open Door Counselling Ltd v Ireland (A/246) (Application Nos.14234/88, 
14253/88) European Court of Human Rights, October 29th 1992, (1993) 15 EHRR 
244.  
33 Abdulaziz, Cabales,and Balkandali v UK 1985 7 EHRR 471, where I appeared for 
the Applicants against Peter Rawlinson QC former Attorney-General. 
34 Klass v Germany (A/28) European Court of Human Rights, 6 September 1978, 
(1979-80) 2 EHRR 214. 
35 Vilvarajah v United Kingdom (A/215) European Court of Human Rights October 
30th  1991 (1992) 14 EHRR 248.  
36 See too Carnwath J in R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex p Shelter 
[1997] COD 49. 
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One mitigating factor of more general importance is the capacity of third 
Parties to intervene in judicial review proceedings.  Judicial review is 
essentially multilateral, not bilateral because of its public interest dimension.  
Under the 1977 rules [053 9r (1)] potentially interested persons had to be 
served once leave was given: and there was provision for others to apply to be 
joined to oppose the application. Under the CPR 57.17 that provision is 
extended to potential supporters as well. 
Interventions by third parties have increased dramatically in England and 
Wales over the last five years, especially at the level of the House of Lords.37
Of equal note has been the shift in the character of interveners: from 
invitees of the court, to applicants to the court; from official or statutory 
authorities (like the EOC), to pressure groups (like Liberty on Justice), 
commercial organisations or professional bodies.    
In Matthews v Ministry of Defence38 Hale L J identified three categories 
of case potentially engaging such intervention; cases which raises wider 
policy issues on which the court needs a fuller range of information: cases in 
which a third party has a direct interest in the outcome; cases in which a third 
party has an indirect interest in the outcome of a decision on a point of law, as 
that decision may be determinative of their own case.   
Not all commentators regard this development of third party intervention 
with unalloyed enthusiasm.  Some question the extent to which the pressure 
groups are representative of their members.39 Others detect a lack of 
consistent principle in the basis for permitting interventions: and question the 
value to the Courts of an avowedly partisan approach in contrast to the neural 
assistance provided by the old style amicus curia or, in one of the clumsy 
neologians consequent upon Lord Woolf’s expulsion of Latin from the 
language of the law, an advocate of the Court.40
But the judiciary are even more involved in issues with a political 
dimension – appointments of junior doctors, restrictions on casino gambling,  
the scope of the inquests into the death of Diana Princess of Wales and Dodi 
Al Fayed, the propriety of ceasing the investigation into alleged corruption in 
37 See the House of Lords Practice Directions and Standing Orders Applicable to Civil 
Appeals, House of Lords (January 1996) Direction 34 1 See also Khan (Sultan) 
[1997] AC 558; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Venables, R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Thompson [1998] AC 407; R v Bow 
Street Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Pinochet Ugarte [2000] AC 61; R v Immigration 
Appeal Tribunal, ex p Shah [1999] 2 AC 629. See generally Louis Blom-Cooper QC 
“Third Party Intervention and Judicial Discretion” [2002] PL 602 (“Blom-Cooper”) 
Sarah Hannett “Third Party Intervention in the Public Interest” [2003] PL 128. 
38 CA April 10th 2000. 
39 C Harlow “Public Law and Popular Justice” (2002) Modern Law Review 1. 
40 Blom-Cooper, above n 37. 
WHO? WHOM? 
44 
                                                     
the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia.41  In this venture they are part volunteer – 
for the ever expanding reach of column law judicial review is their own 
responsibility – part conscript in as much as the HRA compels them to assess 
in areas such as freedom of expression or right to respect for private life what 
“is necessary in a democratic society” to achieve such identified public 
interest aims as national security.  In my view, to put it colloquially, they need 
all the help they can get.   
We may not yet be accustomed to so-called Brandeis briefs in this 
country,42 in which the social and economic impact of a decision one way or 
another is placed before the Supreme Court, but if as Alexander Pope said: “A 
little knowledge is a dangerous thing”, an absence of knowledge is simply 
worse.  Judges can sift the chaff from the wheat. That after all is what they are 
paid for. 
The rules as to standing represent a balance between two aspects of the 
public interest – the desirability of encouraging individual citizens to 
participate actively in enforcing the law on the one hand, but on the other 
hand the undesirability of allowing the meddlesome interloper to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the courts in matters in which he is not concerned with all the 
concomitant waste of time and money. 
In my view, the scales tilt firmly in the favour of the first of those interest 
Lord Diplock stated more than a quarter of a century ago in the Fleet Street 
Casuals case: 
 
“It would, in my view, be a grave lacuna in our system of public law if 
a pressure group, like the Federation, or even a simple public spirited 
taxpayer, were prevented by outdated technical rules of locus standi 
from bringing the matter to the attention of the court to indicate the 
rule of law and get the unlawful action stopped.”43
 
With all the reservations I have not infrequently expressed about the 
danger of the Courts rushing into areas where they should sensibly fear to 
tread, I consider the rules as to standing are obsolete.  Public law, like private 
law, has other mechanisms to prevent abuse of its process including but not 
limited to costs sanctions. 
 
 
 
41 To take a random selection from Blackstone Chambers’ recent caseload. 
42 Andrew Henderson “Brandeis Briefs and Proof of Legislative, Facts in Proceedings 
under the Human Rights Act 1998” [1998] PL 563. 
43 Above n 6, at 644 E. 
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THE WHOM? 
 
I turn to the other part of the Who Whom? formula.  Prior to the 1977 
reforms the test for the whom was one of source.  If the power under 
challenge was the product of statute or secondary legislation the old orders 
ran.  Powers under the prerogative were embraced within the fold in a case 
concerning the extra statutory Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme where 
Lord Parker CJ said “the exact limits of the ancient remedy by way of 
certiorari have never been and ought not to be specifically defined.”44 And 
blessed in the so-called GCHQ case.45  This started a switch in emphasis from 
source to function, which was confirmed in the famous case involving the 
Take-Over Panel.46  But whatever the virtues of the new test, certainty is not 
one of them.  That there are boundaries is clear: where they start and when they 
end is not.   
Bodies whose only source of power is contractual are beyond the pale:  some 
public ingredient is critical.  The various cases show only that the Courts 
deploy a series of open textured phrases to describe that ingredient. In 
Datafin, “public element,”47 as well as “public law functions”,48 in R v Chief 
Rabbi ex p Wachman49 “public law consequences”,50 in Poplar Housing 
Association v Donoghue,51 “public stamp or character”, in RC Heather v 
Leonard Cheshire Foundation,52 “public flavour.”53  
This variety of phrases, focussing on the epithet public, conceals a variety 
of criteria: What is the source of the body’s power? What are the body’s 
functions? What is the nature of those functions? If the body not exist, would 
Parliament be obliged to create something similar? Has it a requisite degree of 
statutory recognition or underpinning to stamp it as a public body?   
The SCA section [31[2]] was, for its part, opaque speaking only of the 
need for “having regard to the nature of the matter in respect of which rule of 
many be granted” by the prerogative orders and the nature of the person 
“bodies against who such relief might be granted.”  The duality of test at least 
confirmed that amenability to judicial review depends not only on the 
character of the body against when such relief is sought, but on the powers 
44 R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex p Lain [1987] 2 QB 864 at 882. 
45 Council of the Civil Service Unions v Minster for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374. 
46 R v Takeover Panel, ex p Datafin [1987] QB 815. 
47 Ibid, per Sir John Donaldson MR at 838. 
48 Ibid, per Lloyd LJ at 847. 
49 [1992] 1 WLR 1036. 
50 Ibid, per  Simon Brown at 1042c. 
51 [2002] QB 48 (“Poplar”). 
52 [2002] 2 All ER 934 (“LCF”). 
53 Ibid, per Lord Woolf MR at para 14. 
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being exercised by it.  This is emphasised in CPR Part 54(1) (2) which 
provides, in material part, that a claim for judicial review means a claim to 
review the lawfulness of “(ii) a decision, action or failure to act in relation to 
the exercise of a public function.”   
The fact that a body has been created by exercise of prerogative power or 
those powers and purposes are provided for by statute is no longer dispositive.  
The Jockey Club shared the first feature, but was held not to be amenable to 
judicial review.54 Limited liability companies shares the second feature but 
are considered as private bodies.  As Wade states “Statutory status without the 
public element is not by itself conclusive.  Statutory powers and duties are 
possessed by many bodies, for example, commercial companies and trustees, 
which having no public element are quite outside the range of judicial 
review.” 55
It is, in consequence.  It is unsurprising that the law reports are littered with 
cases essentially about classification.56    
Judicial review has been applied to the decisions of the Advertising 
Standard Authority,57 the Code of Practice Committee of the British 
Pharmaceutical Society;58 the GMC59 and the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants,60 but not the FA61 or ABTA;62 the Local Government 
Ombudsman,63 but not the Insurance Ombudsman;64 to the LME,65 but not 
Lloyds of London;66 to maintained schools,67 but not public schools68 – (the 
public element is rightly regarded as linguistic camouflage).   There is still no 
definitive ruling on whether the BBC is judicially reviewable – maybe 
54 R v Jockey Club, ex p Aga Khan [1993] 1 WLR 909. 
55 D Pannick QC “Who is Subject to Judicial Review and In Respect of What” [1992] 
PL 1. 
56 R v London Metal Exchange Ltd, ex p Albatros Warehousing BV, QBD, March 30th  
2000, Case No: CO/2470/98; R v The London Metal Exchange ex parte Hoogewerff 
Reserve Ltd Partnership (Proceedings), November 11th 1999, Case No: CO/3538/98. 
57 See; R v NCB, ex p NUM (1986) ICR 791 compare; R v British Coal Corpn, ex p 
Vardy 1993 ICR 720). 
58 R v AJA, ex p Insurance Service Plc [1990] 2 Admin LR 77. 
59 R v Code of Practice Committee of the British Pharmaceutical Society 1991 COD 
228. 
60 R v General Medical Council, ex p Gee 1986 1 WLR 237. 
61 R v Institute of Chartered Accountants, ex p Brindle [1994] BCLC 297. 
62 R v Football Association Ltd, ex p Football League Ltd 1993 2 All ER 833. 
63 R v Association of British Travel Agents, ex p Sunspell Ltd [2001] ACD 16. 
64 R v Local Commissioner for Administration, ex p Eastleigh BC [1988 ] QB 855. 
65 R v Insurance Ombudsman, ex p Aegon Life Insurance Ltd [1994] COD 426. 
66 R v Corporation of Lloyds, ex p Briggs [1983] 1 Lloyds Rep 176. 
67 R v London Borough of Newham, ex p X [1995] ELR 303. 
68 R v Fernhill Manor School, ex p Brown [1982] S Admin LR 159. 
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because of an instructive dislike of the concept of a state broadcasting body,69 
and even where charities, whose very status is impregnated with concepts of 
public interest stand is still unclear.70  The University of Buckingham is, I 
would suggest, immune from judicial review, but the University of Thames 
Valley established under the Further and Higher Education Act 1992 is not,71 
and as for the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge who knows? Not even 
Sir William Wade who adorned both Universities.72
There are yet further complications: There is a distinctive Eurotest for 
bodies against which community directives are directly effective in the sense 
of being enforceable at the suit of individuals.  It is whether the body is an 
“Emanation of State”.  This was shown by the Marshall case73 where the ECJ 
upheld the complaint of discrimination of a woman employed by the Health 
Authority, who was compulsorily retired at 60, whereas her male colleagues 
could soldier on until 65.  I argued the case for Mrs Marshall, but, having now 
reached the age of 65 myself, wonder which sex was actually the victim of 
discrimination. 
The notion of “an emanation of state” has been criticised as “inappropriate 
and undefined.”74 The concept of an “emanation” has an almost spectral 
penumbra; and, as Wade says “drawing a line around the state in this way 
produces obvious anomalies, for example, as between employees of 
government agencies and employees of private companies.”75
A yet third test has been provided by the Section 6 of the HRA 1998 states 
(so far as material): 
 
“(1)It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is 
incompatible with a Convention right. 
 
(3)In this section 'public authority' includes - 
                                                     
69 R (on the application of ProLife Alliance) v BBC [2003] UKHL 23; [2004] 1 AC 
185: the point may have been conceded by silence. 
70 See the contradictory views of eminent chancery judges in cases concerned with the 
Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v (1) HM Attorney-General (2) 
Richard Hannay Meade (3) Nigel Baron Vinson of Roddam Dene (4) Gillian 
Rosemary Atkinson (2001) Ch D 26/1/2001 [2002] 1 WLR 448: Times February 13th 
2001 (Lightman J) and the National Trust. (Scott v National Trust: [1998] 1 WLR 226 
(Robert Walker J). 
71 And see discussion in Hyams: Law of Education p 590. 
72 Wade p 636. 
73 [1986] QB 401. 
74Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank 
[2004] 1 AC 546 (“Aston Cantlow”), (“Aston Cantlow”), per Lord Hope at para 55.   
75 Wade p 203. 
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(a) a court or tribunal, and 
(b) any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public 
nature, 
 
(5) In relation to a particular act, a person is not a public authority by 
virtue only of subsection (3) (b) if the nature of the act is private.” 
 
The HRA distinguishes between ‘core’ public authorities (section 6(1)) 
and ‘hybrid public’ authorities (Section 6(3) (b) and Section 6(5)).  In relation 
to the former all their acts engage the HRA; in relation to the latter not if the 
nature of the acts is private.  There is a structural affinity between the HRA to 
the CPR test in focussing attention on both the nature of the body and the 
nature of the act, but not an identity, since the nature of the act will always be 
the key test in ordinary judicial review whereas, for core public authorities 
under the HRA it will not be.  Unfortunately the first case to reach the House 
of Lords on the meaning of public authority, Aston Cantlow,76 concerned a 
peculiar relic of Canon law – the liability to repair the channel of the parish 
church owed to the Parochial Church council by owners of former glebe land 
in their capacity lay rectors of a parish. 
It is a legal cliché that hard cases make bad law, but it is equally true that 
odd cases make uneven law.  The Court of Appeal held that the PCC was a 
public authority enforcing a tax to which infringed property rights protected 
by Article 1 of the First Protocol in the Convention.  Bought in to defend that 
decision in the House of Lords, I had my doubts – which proved in the event 
to be well founded.  The House of Lords held that the PCC was neither a core 
nor a hybrid public authority. 
A core public authority was defined as “essentially a body whose nature is 
governmental in the broad sense of that expression”. It is in respect of 
organisations of this nature that the government is answerable under the 
European Convention on Human Rights,77 classic example of a “core” public 
authority being a government department.78  
Ordinarily ‘Crown’ can be equated with Government.  In Mersey Docks 
and Harbour Board v Cameron79 the Crown was held to extend to, inter alios, 
persons who were carrying out public purposes required and created by the 
Government for the purposes of government.  Included in the catalogue of 
Crown Bodies have been a county territorial association.80 The Wartime 
76 Above n 74, per Lord Hope at para 55. 
77 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead para 7, per Lord Hope para 47.   
78 Ibid per Lord Nicholls. 
79 1865 II HLC 4432. 
80 Territorial and Auxiliary Forces Association v Nicholls [1949] 1 KB 35. 
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Custodian of Enemy Property;81 a Hospital Management Committee.82  In 
Town Investments83 Lord Diplock said “in exercising the functions of 
Government the civil servants of the Crown are all engaged in carrying on a 
single business on behalf of the Crown ie Her Majesty’s Government is the 
United Kingdom”,84 something repeated by Lord Walker describing the 
Crown “the executive government in its various emanations.”85 A body which 
is the Crown qua government is certainly a public authority; although bodies 
which are not part of the Crown may be.     
A hybrid public authority defied precise definition Lord Nicholls said 
“Factors to be taken into account include the extent to which in carrying out 
the relevant functions, the body is publicly funded, or is exercising statutory 
powers, or is taking the place of central government or local authorities, or is 
providing a public service.”86  But as Lord Hope noted; “It is the function that 
the person is performing that is determinative of the question whether it is, for 
the purposes of that (ie each) case a “hybrid public authority.”87    
The question as to whether a body engages human rights obligations is 
one of fact and degree “sensitive to the facts of each case.”88
So diffuse is the case law that the Joint Committee on Human Rights89 
announced an enquiry into the meaning of “public authority” under the HRA 
because of the “uncertainty” created by judicial decisions. 
I should now confess that in preparing my lecture I confronted every 
finalist’s nightmare i.e. the prospect of an imminent potential change in the 
law by the highest judicial body in the land, the House of Lords.90  
Then pending before the House of Lords was the case of YL v Birmingham 
City Council and Southern Cross Healthcare Ltd91 about whether a private care 
81 Bank voor Handel en Scheepwaat v Administrator of Hungarian Property [1954] 
AC 584. 
82 Nottingham No1 Area Hospital Management Committee v Owen [1958] 1 QB 50. 
83 Town Investments v Department of the Environmental [1978] AC 359. 
84 Ibid, at 385. 
85 Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group Plc v Inland Revenue Commissioners House of 
Lords [2006] UK HL 49.
86 Aston Cantlow: Lord Nicholls (para 12). 
87 Ibid Lord Hope para 41.   
88 Lord Woolf MR Poplar, above n 51, at para 66.  
89 November 23rd 2006. 
90 Lord Denning, an honorand of this University, often recounted the story of a young 
student who complained to him about the frequency with which he changed the law 
on the eve of the examination. Being Lord Denning it was a story he recounted on 
more than one occasion. 
91 [2007] 3 All ER 957. 
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home providing care and accommodation to service users under a contract with 
the local authority is subject to the HRA, as being: 
 
“any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public 
nature.” 
 
The function of a solicitor or barrister giving advice as to merits in the 
context of contested litigation is one of prophecy as much as of analysis.  I 
therefore stated boldly in my lecture that in my view the appellant would 
succeed and indeed that, if the House of Lords took a more generous approach 
to the concept of public function, they will, as far as possible amalgamate the 
triple tests, that of the SCA and CPR, that of community law and that of HRA, 
which have hitherto been analysed, at any rate by Lord Hope of Craighead in 
Aston Cantlow92 as overlapping but not coincident. 
I was too bold.  I console myself with the thought that the distinguished 
forensic and judicial careers of the majority (Lords Scott, Mance and 
Neuberger) were mainly in areas outwith public law, and the majority who 
had greater public law pedigree thought the outcome clear.93  The House of 
Lords by 3-2 rejected the appeal.94 Furthermore academic commentary on the 
decision has been almost uniformly critical,95 but rather than repeating the 
arguments I advanced orally, I have deleted them from this text and direct 
readers’ attention to the, as always, luminous speech of Lord Bingham.96
Does any of this matter other than to enthusiasts for procedural 
taxonomy? 
92 Above n 74, at paras 34-55 see cf: through: Burnton J R (on the application of 
Mullins) v Jockey Club Appeal Board (No 1) Queen's Bench Division (Administrative 
Court), October 17  2005 th [2005] EWHC 2197 (Admin); [2006] ACD 2; Times 
October 24th 2005; R. (on the application of Mullins) v Jockey Club Appeal Board 
(No.2) Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court), October 17th 2005 [2005] 
EWHC 2517. 
93  J Landau “Functional Public Authorities after YL” [2007] PL 630;  “Law Lords 
Knock back Care Home Human Rights Plea. Care Homes; Human Rights; Local 
Authorities’ Powers and Duties; Public Authorities” (2007) 157 NLJ (7279) 907; Care 
homes; Public Authorities; Residential care; Right to Respect for Private and Family 
Life; Statutory Interpretation. [2007] 151 (24) SJ 782; Alder “The Status of a 
Residential Care Home under the Human Rights Act 1998” [2007] 10 JLH 107; M 
Elliott “‘Public’and ‘Private’: Defining the Scope of the Human Rights Act” [2007] 
66 Cambridge Law Journal 487; and the Joint Committee on Human Rights has 
expressed its disappointment of the outcome.   
94 [2007] 3 WLR 112. 
95 Paul Craig “Contracting Out, the Human Rights Act and the Scope of Judicial 
Review” (2002) 118 Law Quarterly Review 551. 
96 Lord Bingham at para 2, Baroness Hale at para 72. 
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There are a number of reasons to suggest that it does not – at any rate too 
greatly.   
Firstly, there is the demise of the so-called rule in O’Reilly v Mackman97 
This case, designed to segregate the procedures of public from those of 
private law normally made the judicial review normally obligatory when it 
was available and spawned a series of cases in which public authorities, where 
challenges were made to their decisions either by way of private law claims or 
by raising vires points by way of defence, would contend, even up to the 
House of Lords, so as to avoid any consideration of the merits that the other 
party was in the wrong forum.  It has been slowly eroded to the extent that the 
exceptions have all but engulfed the rule itself.98
Secondly, whereas RSC 053 only allowed for a transfer out of an 
application for judicial review, which should have been made by way of 
ordinary action and then subject to various technicalities, the Civil Procedure 
rules provide more helpfully for two-way traffic.99   
Thirdly and most importantly, there has been a cross pollination of private 
law by public law principles.  Persons or bodies exercising discretionary 
powers which, where they were public authorities, would find themselves 
subject to duties to act lawfully, fairly and rationally, are increasingly held by 
the Courts to be subject to precisely the same obligations.  It was always and 
necessarily the case that private bodies had to act in accordance with the law, 
but there has been a growing recognition that the rules of natural justice are 
not ring fenced under the public law sphere: and latterly the notion that the 
exercise of any discretionary power has to be informed by material 
considerations and not impaired by immaterial ones has been steadily 
advanced.100
One area, of growing significance in the legal world as in the world at 
large, where the issue has been recently been resurrected is in sport.101  The 
97 [1983] AC 273. 
98 Esp Steed v Home Secretary [2000] 1 WLR 1169, Clark v University of 
Lincolnshire and Humberside [2000] 1 WLR 1988.  See generally Michael Beloff QC 
“The Rule in O’Reilly and Mackman: a Cautionary Tale” in V Iyer (ed) Essays in 
Honours of H M Seervai (Delhi: Universal Law Publishing Co, 2001).  
99 CPR 54 [4]. 
100 R v East Berkshire Health Authority, ex p Walsh (1995) OB 882. Equitable Life 
Insurance v Hyman [2002] 1 AC 585. 
101 See generally E Grayson Sport and Law (London: Butterworths, 3rd edn, 1999); M 
Beloff, T Kerr and M Demetriou Sports Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999); M 
Beloff “Pitch, Pool, Rink…Court?  Judicial Review in the Sporting World” [1989] PL 
95; Colin Munro: “Sport in the Courts” [2005] PL 681. The University of 
Buckingham’s Law Faculty enjoys special expertise in this field. 
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general attitude of the Courts to sporting disputes is encapsulated in the 
dictum of Scot Baker LJ:  
 
“It is in my judgment of paramount importance that sporting bodies 
should be given as free a hand as possible, consistent with the 
fundamental requirements of fairness, to run their own disciplinary 
promises without the interference of the Courts.”102  
 
But what if there is some blatant unfairness or manifest perversity?  The 
Court will interfere even with reluctance applying conventional public law 
tests, but not yet by public law procedures.  In Bradley v Jockey Club,103 the 
Court of Appeal, in dismissing an appeal against a penalty as being 
disproportionate, commended the analysis given by Richards J who had said 
that the court’s supervisory role in a private law claim did not require 
adoption of a “materially different approach from a judicial review claim.”104
The amenability of national sports regulators to judicial review appears 
foreclosed short of the House of Lords by the decision of R v Disciplinary 
Committee of the Jockey Club, ex p Aga Khan105 R v Football Association 
Limited, ex p Football League Ltd,106 although there have been indications 
pre-Aga Khan, that senior judge would have preferred, if free to do so, to 
follow the judicial review route.107  The most recent attempt to reverse Aga 
Khan, R (on the Application of Mullins) v Board of the Jockey Club 108 failed 
(it may be predictably) before Stanley Burnton J (adopting case where a 
disqualification of a doped horse by an Appeal Board of a Jockey Club) even 
though the plaintiff had had no contractual remedy.    
102 Flaherty v National Greyhound Racing Club Ltd (2006 S&M ISLR SLR 8) at para 
79.  
103 Bradley v Jockey Club Court of Appeal (Civil Division) July 12th 2005 [2005] 
EWCA Civ 1056; Times, July 14th 2005. 
104 Bradley v Jockey Club (Application for New Ground of Appeal) Court of Appeal 
(Civil Division), 28 June 2005 [2005] EWCA Civ 851 (at [37]), citing in support dicta 
from Lord Woolf  MR in Wilander v Tobin [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 293 at 300. 
105 [1993] 1WLR 909. 
106 (1993) 2 All ER 833. 
107 R v Jockey Club, ex p Massingberd Munday [1993] 2 All ER 2002 (Neill and Roch 
LJ, R v Jockey Club, ex p Ram Racecourses [1993] 2 All ER 267 finding themselves 
bound by an earlier decision of Law v National Greyhound Racing Club [1983] 1 
WLR 1302) where, in a topsy-turvey application of O’Reilly v Mackmann, the 
defendant had the plaintiff’s action dismissed for having instituted proceedings by 
way of judicial review, not contract. 
108 2006 2 SLR, SLR 30 and n 92 above. 
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But there are powerful arguments the other way based on the Datafin 
functional approach109 and derivative tests: whether, but for the existence of a 
non-statutory body, government would intervene to regulate, whether 
government has acquiesced in or encouraged the activities of the body whose 
decisions is under challenge; whether the body’s power are monopolistic, 
whether the aggrieved party ahs consensually submitted to be bound by the 
decision-maker – not whether he has chosen to undertake the regulated 
activity at all (where he has true freedom), but whether he has actually chosen 
to be regulated in that activity (where he has none).  Lord Denning MR in his 
classic dissent110 emphasised by the analogy between public authorities “and 
domestic bodies which control the destinies of thousands” in suggesting that 
the same principles should apply to supervision of their decisions.  That battle 
has, as I have already noted, been won: but the conclusion that the same 
procedures should apply has not at any rate south of the border – or abroad111 
- although, intriguely but so far unproductively, the Court of Appeal in Aga 
Khan “left open the question whether in other circumstances where there 
would be no alternative remedy its decisions could be reviewable.”112    
The larger question whether the courts can, or should cut through the 
tangle and recognise the realities of power in societies, free standing of stark 
connection,113 so as to attract the remedies provided by judicial review, is 
beyond the reach of this lecture.  Law is in this elsewhere a battle ground 
between certainty and flexibility.  For my part I consider (cautiously) that 
procedure should be the sevvant of substance, not its mistress. 
109 “Why Aga Khan is Wrong” Michael Beloff QC and Tim Kerr [1996] Judicial 
Review  3. 
110 Breen v ATU  (1971) 2 QB 175 at 190. 
111 Finnigan v New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc [1985] 2 NZLR 159; Justice v 
South Australian Trotting Control Board (1989) 50 SASR. 613; Jockey Club of South 
Africa v Forbes (1993) (1) SA 648. 
112 This may be a case for horse for courses.  The Jockey Club was described by Gray 
J as “a public authority in every sense of that term” in Jockey Club v Buffham [2003] 
2 WLR 178 at 195.    
113 Sir Gordon Borrie “The Regulation of Public and Private Power” [1989] PL 552 
and Sir Harry Woolf “Judicial Review: A Possible Programme for Reform” [1992] 
PL 221. 
